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Full Paper

The Study of Civil- Military Relations

Scientific research on C - MR has evolved in four waves of study since 2WW, where, in the late '50s, authors, especially in U.S., after Korean War, gave an in-depth attention to what can in broad terms be called the "relations between the soldier and the state".

In this first wave, theorists (Huntington, Howard, Janowitz, Finer, Karsten), developed theories from empirical observations of Western democracies, arguing that "military professionalism," is the decisive concept to keep the military out of politics. This functional approach is linked to technical expertise and military "secondary" virtues, such as discipline, accuracy, "military craft," and a high degree of responsibility to the public and its citizens. This professionalism will make the officer corps focus its loyalty on the military ideal. Motivated by this loyalty, such a politically neutral military would ultimately accept the civilian authority as the legitimate superior of the state and carry out its orders without a risk of military intervention. Janowitz did not agree with this logic, concluding in a more sociological approach that transformation in technology and society, as well as in missions, had led to an even greater political role of the military. This role, however, was far from involvement like a coup d'état, at least in the U.S., due to the apolitical ethic of the military profession. Finer countered Huntington's main argument by his observations of the highly professional and technically competent German and Japanese armies' interventions in politics, preventing any attempt to devalue those armies as being not fully professional or as being armies of non- democracies by challenging Huntington's concept of professionalism. Karsten expands Finer's criticism by noting that "the military will always have *some* political role in even the most mature competitive democracy." This is to be seen as an answer to Huntington's enhanced argument that democratization has led to improved C-MR and limited involvement of armed forces in politics.

The second wave of study (1963 to 1979) and can be related mainly to the development of economic and political theory. Given the important political changes in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, as well as in Latin America, and developments in Asia and Africa, all closely connected to strong military involvement, the studies in this period focused on theories to explain policy outcomes and the likeliness of coups d'état. The research of this likeliness gained momentum through the developments in Turkey (1960), France (1961), and Greece (1967). Polar to the more empirical approach during the first wave, scholars like van Doorn developed a highly theoretical framework for C-MR and democratic control of armed forces in general, but also in the light of the Vietnam War and the end of military conscription in US. After 10 years of inconspicuous research and as a consequence of the

political events in Eastern Europe and Germany, the focus shifted again.

The third wave of democratization, beginning in 1989 drew the attention in the field of civil-military relations research to the modernization challenges faced by countries of post-communist Europe, then transforming into democracies and reforming their armed forces and security sectors. For over a decade, NATO and PfP remained the focal point for institutionalist approaches that explored policy transfer mechanisms with regard to international security. In parallel, the advent of major theoretical paradigms, such as neo-realistic, post-modernistic, (social) constructivist, liberalist, positivistic, and rational choice approaches, changed the respective methodological angles towards C-MR. In the view of this author, this trend towards rigid scholarly categorization detracted from the growing demand for a multidisciplinary approach to civil-military relations. In the context of decreasing scholarly interest in the question of civil-military relations in the early twenty-first century, the rise of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of EU as a consequence of Kosovo (1999), and with it the build-up of the European security architecture attracted scholarly attention.

Thus, the fourth-wave work dealt with civil-military relations in post-conflict states as well as the initial missions and operations of ESDP with a view to civil-military cooperation. Along with that, domestic factors, characteristics, and norms within EU candidate states as well as institutional reform capability itself were examined. Only a few scholars paid attention to the overall context and incorporated cultural and case-based experiences and lessons learned. Yet, they generally did not comprehensively incorporate socio-cultural factors. Sociological aspects of status and role, however, are considered to be crucial for the general set-up of C-MR within a society and nation. Studies of the post-communist democracies or the debate about the crisis of civil-military relations in the U.S. provide evidence that problems can still arise within countries where the potential of political influence by the military leadership through coercion is virtually excluded. Even if those problems are of a different nature than those discussed here, they are still relevant to the principle question about the quality of a democratic society in that effectiveness of civilian control, its respective constitutional consequences, and the participative quality of a democratic society are linked to the consolidation of democracy as such. Against this background and as an exception to the trend, the work of Abenheim addressed national experiences with the social integration of soldiers over time and the cultural aspects of civil-military relations. Scholars did address sociological factors and their ethical implications for the emerging privatization of security and the increasing recourse to private military companies in conflict regions. The prevailing argument is that increasing privatization abroad weakens domestic civil-military ties. Some noted that the literature continues to focus on traditional aspects of civilian control of the military, one could claim that new security challenges require a shift in methods to enhance defense efficiency and military effectiveness.

Civil- Military Relations and European Integration

Work on C-MR generally concerns two dimensions: a) *scholars investigate how procedural relations are set up institutionally on the strategic and operational levels/ the functional dimension* b) *scholars explore how the armed forces are embedded into society, how interaction takes place, and what the underlying principles and perceptions concerning civil-military relations are/ the sociological dimension*. The functional dimension has been by far the more frequently researched one with regard to the development over the past 10 years of the EU in general and ESDP in particular. According to the sociological dimension, we can investigate the conceptual genesis in connection with the usage of key terms. In doing so, it provides evidence to verify the underlying assumption that there is ambiguity regarding key

terms in the field of C-MR within the framework of the EU, with substantially different connotations among EU member states, and that ambiguity has not been addressed comprehensively yet by parliaments, by European institutions, by soldiers or even scholars to the degree warranted by the needs of the moment. Hence, it is useful to investigate whether there are commonly accepted norms and values with regard to the relationship between citizens of EU member states and their military forces that have been officially agreed to and published. One has to note that such principles are not present in EU's treaties of Rome (March 25, 1957), of Maastricht (February 7, 1993), of Amsterdam (October 2, 1997), of Nice (February 1, 2003), and of Lisbon (December 1, 2009), nor are they explicit in criteria that accession candidate states must satisfy for membership in the EU.

Accession candidates, such as post-communist countries, in addition to formal admission criteria for EU membership, are implicitly expected to accept unwritten rules and norms. But what are those norms with respect to C-MR? To explore them, distinct approaches to the different domains of C-MR should be examined. According to Greenwood, there are five domains: *a) the relationship between the military and the state b) the relationship between the military and the executive branch of government c) the oversight power of the legislature d) the relationship between the military and a country's domestic security community e) the relationship between the military and pluralistic society at large.* While the first three appear to belong more to the functional dimension, the fourth and fifth relate more to the sociological one. Besides this approach, other definitions include all relations between the military and civilian society, namely, between soldiers and citizens. If one follows liberal democracy theory, balanced C-MR are always linked to, and based on, the democratic control of the armed forces, which means that the military is unambiguously subordinated to the lawfully-elected democratic civilian authorities, who, in turn, do not meddle with purely professional military affairs. Additionally, it is assumed that military leadership does not have unwarranted public influence beyond its professional domain, i.e. public sector expenditure. Therefore, and even if not officially agreed to in official EU documents, this can also be assumed as the general position across EU m-s.

At EU level, there is no comprehensive approach/CA at all to the sociological dimension of C-MR, but only a functional effectiveness based on time worn, non-comprehensive concepts which neglect the control issue: EU is lacking a CA to C-MR!. But this does not contribute much to the question at hand. It seems as if everything is linked to "control" (term open to many meanings freighted with considerable conflict and misunderstanding). To develop the argument further, it is useful to explore what stands behind the key term for balanced C-MR: the stressed perception of democratic control of the military. It is commonplace that C-MR can be gauged by the way interactions of policy and operations take place. balanced C-MR are normally subjected to a functional democratic control in state and society as well as the international system. Yet, a problem arises when investigating how this can be achieved in EU m-s, as in other mature democracies: it is assumed that these countries have developed adequate C-MR, but when investigating how this control functions in fact, it seems to be the military's professional adherence to democratic principles rather than the imposed executive power of the civil authority to control the military in practice. Therefore, it is not only the institutional set-up and rule of law that provides the civil control, at least not alone, but rather the political legitimacy of the civil authority which also relies on the continuous will of the armed forces to value the democratic state. There have obviously been quite a few cases where armed forces, or, more explicitly, leading military figures, have not adhered to this will, with results that range from suspension to (attempts of) coups d'état.

A mere declaration that the military is controlled is no guarantee that it really is and also is no explanation of how this control works in the first place. The emerging harmony is, besides social and political harmony, the foundation for effective defense. It requires a

culture which is based on a comprehensive framework of institutional set-up and civil authority. Hence, dogmatic demands for unconditional democratic civilian control of the military without explaining, at the same time, what exactly is meant by that, lack the necessary comprehensive approach. It is quite obvious that whatever is meant by democratic civilian control cannot be a matter of coincidence but has to rest on a sound conceptual and normative framework. At the domestic level, concepts and civil-military regimes can generally be found. However, institutional set-ups, rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures, all affecting C-MR, are different among EU m-s due to their national cultural, historical, and political distinctiveness. However, the lack of such a conceptual and normative framework at the EU level is problematic, especially as it touches upon one central political challenge of the EU: its democratic legitimacy. The lack of democratic legitimacy within EU became blatant after the negative referendums in the Netherlands and France during the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty in 2006. One year before, the European Council had already noted a gap between EU citizens and EU institutions. To bridge this gap and to remedy the lack of legitimacy, the Council attempted to initiate a broad debate by holding a convention on the future of the EU.

However, this undertaking failed. Remarkably, Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP), as well as the ESDP, were barely mentioned, however, looking at the speed of development of this policy area that defines the EU's external activities to a large extent, it is only logical to explore questions of legitimacy in this policy area also, which relies upon civil and military capabilities of EU m-s as well as the increasing build-up of EU means. In the context of C-MR, in the framework of ESDP, an interchange of ideas through public debate within EU's civil society and within EU's institutional setting about the further transformation and integration of its armed forces seems indispensable with a view also to legitimacy. Legitimacy of ESDP, however, has so far only been addressed officially in an output-oriented manner in the context of ESDP mission results (output legitimacy) and with a view to civil-military cooperation effectiveness (the functional dimension). Legitimacy of ESDP has so far not been addressed in an input-oriented manner in terms of the sociologic dimension of EU's C-MR. This input-legitimacy in ESDP is based on the various democratic cultures, institutions, procedures, and norms of the respective EU member states—mainly through national parliamentary participation and control. On the one side, this input-legitimacy is linked to national constitutional limits with a view to the (decisions about the) employment of armed forces within the framework of ESDP. On the other side, the more greatly enhanced process of European integration of EU m-s' armed forces is desirable and necessary for the EU's overall development.

The ESDP Factor

There are five areas of ESDP: origins, decision making, capabilities, missions and operations, and strategic culture. Civil-military relations affect all of these areas in turn. However, this thesis only relates to the last one, that of strategic culture. Scholars have noted that, if there was a common EU strategic culture, it would be "heavily influenced by civilian-military synergies." For others, a common strategic culture has clearly and unsurprisingly not developed among 27 disparate member states, unless it has been that of NATO as well as, in certain cases, somewhat that of U.S. military operations in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns. The debate about whether or not the EU is developing a common strategic culture has been ongoing since 1999. The opinions about the EU developing a strategic culture are split into two camps: the optimistic one is stressing the converging aspects within the realm of ESDP, and the pessimistic one pronounces divergence. The term "strategic culture" has been challenged by the broadened term "security culture". "Security culture" gets rid of the "heroic" and "martial" approach to the topic, and therefore

is "more appropriate as a label for whatever collective mindset is in fact taking shape in the EU." However, in terms of operationalization, we can use both terms synonymously, proposing "strategic culture as comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community's pursuit of security and defense goals." The conclusion for the time being is that the EU is developing some kind of strategic culture with areas of convergence but also remaining disparities among EU m-s.

C-MR within ESDP implicitly assume certain common propositions and perceptions. However, different national perceptions of security challenges have been a significant obstacle to developing comprehensive common EU policies. The development of a comprehensive and common civil-military perception within the EU is "a bottom-up process that requires the alignment of m-s' conceptions", thereby contributing to a single European Union strategic culture, an ambition implicitly set by European Security Strategy (ESS). Despite the fact that increased civil-military cooperation in the definition being used has to be based on common norms of civil-military relations, this dimension has not yet been addressed officially. C-MR in their sociological dimension have only been dealt with implicitly, despite the risk of varying perceptions and different intentions based on divergent norms regarding the matter. As stated in the 2008 report of the European Council on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2003), coherence and coordination remain key challenges for EU security. However, at the institutional level, competences are dispersed within European Council complex structures. A more integrated civil-military structure is necessary. Within the European Commission, the situation was even worse due to the internal struggle for competences among the different general directorates. In some ESDP missions, competences have been distributed over all three pillars of the EU in the past.

Having come into effect on December 1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon could improve the situation by streamlining the EU's "unwieldy bureaucracy." Formally the three-pillar structure of the EU is being dissolved, and this will probably lead to a more coherent EU program of action and will influence outside perceptions of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty includes basically the same provisions in the domain of CFSP and (as it is now called) CSDP as the ill-fated EU Constitutional Treaty. It is, however, intended to allow for a more active international role of the EU with regard to its stated ambitions in general and should provide a more coherent, effective, and visible Common Security and Defence Policy for EU. CSDP will remain an integral part of CFSP and encompasses the deployment of civilian and military means for peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening of the international community. The implementation is likely to depend to a high degree on the cooperation among the top three EU posts at the political level: the (permanent) President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (at the same time Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for external relations). At the institutional level, decisions on CSDP matters will still require unanimous support of the EU member states within the domain of the European Council and without the participation of the Commission and the European Parliament (EP). However, the High Representative now has the right to take initiatives and can, in cooperation with the Commission, resort to Commission instruments. The HR's new role and double-hatting could therefore contribute to overall strengthening of the cohesion of EU crisis management even if it formally remains under intergovernmental and common competences.

But, still, an ambiguity remains. As agreed, EU documents continuously demand more coherence, synergy, and cooperation. One possible conclusion is that the 27 EU member states not only have internalized the EU as part of their domestic policy, but still see the EU

partially as an object of their respective foreign policies. In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon preserves national autonomy in the realm of CFSP and CSDP decision-making through ultimately continuing the principle of unanimity. The gap between the rhetorical integration ambition, and factual expressions of keeping distance from it, as could be observed during the ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon, has yet to be bridged. Therefore, it can be doubted that the approach within the EU, up to now, is yet sufficient for the future shape of a common strategic culture. But, there has not been an effort to prepare a comprehensive EU concept with definitions of key terms and fundamental principles for C-MR. Nonetheless, EU has developed some approaches to the topic. However, these documents address only the domains of decision-making, operations and missions (implementation of civilian and military instruments in crisis management), or capabilities. Focusing solely on the functional dimension of C - M R , they totally omit the socio-cultural aspect. The initial outlining paper on civil-military relations within ESDP, *Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO)*, although rhetorically underlining "the central importance of CMCO as a culture of co-ordination," refers solely to the technical and institutional necessity for effective co-ordination of civilian and military instruments in a comprehensive approach, but does not further elaborate the cultural aspects of the topic. What is described as "the need for a culture of co-ordination rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures and procedures" and as "an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU's response to a crisis," thereby adding an intrinsic element, is in fact not further filled with a cultural content that goes beyond the direct relationship to crisis response operations. Thus, the official perception of "culture" is left with a merely technical connotation. The related hypothesis is that this linguistic ambiguity contributed to an insufficient comprehension and perception of civil-military relations within the framework of ESDP and affected all follow-on conceptual work on the subject insofar as the strategic, cultural, and sociological dimensions were never really considered. This claim can be substantiated by recent officially agreed-upon announcements within the framework of ESDP. During the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in September 2009 in Goteborg, Sweden, the nexus of C-MR for the ambitions of European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 remained within the functional dimension only.

"Civil-military requirements and synergies for future missions and operations" are linked only to capability development, not to the enhancement of a respective cultural environment [see, Swedish EU Presidency Report on a civil-military capability development seminar, where, based on "experiences from ESDP missions and operations" and with a view to "EU perspectives on future civilian and military capability development," the findings and recommendations concerning future concepts emphasize coordination and cooperation efforts, thereby again taking into account only the functional dimension of C-MR]. The necessity for a harmonization of methodology and the lack of a respective formal coordination mechanism were noted only in the margin. A dilemma for the EU's crisis management ambitions is the "capability- expectations gap: while EU is taking on an increasing number of missions and developing a growing profile as a security actor, it does not always engage resources to back up its commitments." This fact provides an indication as to why overall strategic culture within ESDP framework was and remains driven merely by a functional focus.

Military Culture in EU

A cultural aspect that is undergoing transformation is military identity. Western European armed forces are under pressure from their parent societies, the political elite, and the international community "to change [their] exclusiveness into a more civilianized outlook. The military has lost some of its classic military functions regarding the national security of the country and gained some new military functions reflecting operations other than war/MOOTW. Contemporary armed forces in Europe [and] soldiers from different

countries are developing a new sense of multicultural military identity. This means the overwhelming conversion of a nation-based military mind into an international military identity." But this development brings along also the widening of "the cultural gap between civilian values and military values." It is worth noting in this context that culture is not inherited but learned and that it derives not from genes but from a social environment. The socio-cultural environment in EU member states changes, and this also affects their armed forces. Post materialistic values and "greater cultural diversity, the essence of postmodernism," affect traditional values in a way that weakens them and strengthens individual rights. "Soldiers are no longer motivated by patriotism. They are much more interested in their working conditions than before; and there is a decline of trust in institutions in general and in military institutions in particular." However, it can be assumed that through the character of ESDP missions and operations in the past, public confidence in the military has in general regained strength, with around a 2/3 positive vote in France and Germany, and over 8/10 of confidence in UK. The relationship between a parent society and its armed forces is extremely complex and dynamic. The responsiveness of the public to military operations and missions is unique to every EU m-s.

Notwithstanding the basic trend that, even from formerly pacifist and military-critical parts of a parent society, interventions within the realm of ESDP have been increasingly accepted by EU citizens, there has been a backlash. If one follows the argument that, at the domestic level, a parent society has been disappointed by the results of ESDP missions and operations. It is possible to argue, that, despite a generally positive attitude towards the EU and even ESDP, the reluctance to be in favor of a leading national role in those missions and operations increases in the face of the manifest problems of security building and peace enforcement in the shadow of the disorder of the twenty-first century. This fact promotes the ambiguity to be in favor and against ESDP developments at the same time, which, in turn, has a significant impact on national behavior at EU level. At the domestic level, and without looking at the micro level of military subcultures, such as the differences between one country's army, navy, and air force, one can note national differences within the major aspects of culture, military routine, hierarchy, and discipline, when contrasting respective EU m-s. There seems to be a common international military culture in the Euro-Atlantic space, granted the historical development of armies and societies, that could be described as homogenous, and this military culture obviously differs from a civilian organization's culture.

This leads to two conclusions: *a) military and civilian cultures are sui generis problematic concerning compatibility b) military cultures could still differ significantly when compared nationally.* When, for example, military academies and officer education are compared, Germany and France appear to be rather institution-oriented, which is connected to their officers sustaining lifetime commitment to the armed forces. On the contrary, in UK careers are generally shorter, which has an effect on the perception of military life that is not seen as much in the center as in France and Germany. However, when it comes to the degree of coerciveness, the French system is structurally much stricter than the German or British ones, which are considered to be more "enabling" in nature. Along the same line, discipline is not as much of an issue in military academies in Germany as it is in France, where it has a very high importance, originating from the bureaucratic and centralistic Gaullism, which gives great importance to state institutions and which emphasizes formalism in military culture. In UK, military discipline also has a very high standing. However, this is for other reasons, such as the distinctive British hierarchy within the military and the absolute power of its academies. With the change away from conscription in France in the middle-1990s, and the general trend towards a more civilian, business-like culture within the armed forces, it will be interesting to observe a possible change over the next decades either towards adopting armed forces or towards a conservative backlash granted the shared combat experience in distant

lands, as well as the potential for a growing sense of military caste in the absence of conscription and recent socio economic crisis. The question of whether the end of conscription causes a disconnect of the armed forces from their parent society, which weakens the democratic spirit within the military, could not be answered at this point.

A New Military Profession in CSDP Domain?

Common Security and Defence Policy /CSDP (previously, ESDP/ European Defence and Security Policy), an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), for, almost two decades, has marked a 'peaceful invasion' of all national Militaries into the European institutional and organizational construction. This, in turn, led to a 'real cultural revolution', a 'strong professional surprise', as well as a 'remarkable shift' for EU m-s' officers, as they had been familiar with NATO as a sole multinational framework for European defence and security since 50's. In posts dealing with ESDP (*EU Military Institutions /operational & staff level*), two main types are to be found: a) *military expert posts [military cooperation experience needed]* b) *political/ diplomatic posts [high potentiality required]*. In addition, there is an 'unclear process' of sharing officers among NATO headquarters and ESDP /EU Military posts, where the element of 'having no American leadership in ESDP as it exists in NATO', remains a critical factor.

In such an environment, traditional military profession is not anymore focusing on 'preparing battles' or 'deterring war by military means', but implies 'communicative / diplomatic competences and skills', in order to become able, collectively, to 'plan, negotiate and lead EU CMOs, humanitarian missions and PKOs', combining technical expertise with diplomacy. ESDP/ CSDP, perfectly demonstrating the evolution of the military profession, has led to the creation of an 'ESDP profession', through various 'pathways' of national foreign policy Europeanization process: *national policy adjustment to an EU-formulated policy/ acceptance of EU legal pressure- balancing of external political pressures; national policy legitimization through modification /replacement of national interests with common; institutional adjustments to influence domestic policy actors - policy implications; procedural socialization due to the acceptance by national officials of 'EU policy- making co-ordination culture / 'coordination reflex'. A traditional national military profession is being transformed into an 'EU- level, innovative, profession', a complete policy task that is being planned and implemented centrally, not regionally, as in the past. A 'Europeanized skilled and learned occupation'. Here, we need to: examine the extent to which professional military ethos accommodates national habits in Brussels and constitutes a pattern of behaviour towards civilian actors (diplomats) and other (national) military actors; investigate whether institutional socialising processes operating in Brussels and national capitals have overcome national military habits of officers charged with ESDP issues; assess whether national officers practice and conceptualize ESDP alike on the basis of a shared professional ethos.*

While, national military culture remains a major reference, we need to keep in mind that, ESDP would contribute to the 'opening (of the ESDP) towards civilian institutions', as well as to the 'implementation of a common culture of security and defence'. Furthermore, after the creation of the European Security and Defence College/ ESDC, its first symbolic objective was to, 'further enhance European security culture within ESDP'. To this direction, the integration and harmonization of European defence and military education have been 'clear and consistent' objectives. Military profession in the ESDP domain, thus, stands at the crossroads of Military and diplomacy, placing both, (national) MoDs and officers in an 'intermediate position', demanding them to 'apply defence and military diplomacy' through 'mixing technical expertise with political/diplomatic analysis, 'communicating and negotiating between military and civil-diplomatic actors' and 'balancing military and political decision-making processes'.